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Non technical summary 
Many school-leavers enter the labour market via temporary employment. 
As employers could exploit the weak bargaining position of job starters, 
fixed-term contracts at the beginning of the labour market career are often 
criticized. However, temporary employment at this stage may as well act 
as a stepping stone into permanent employment. This is the case if it is 
easier to transit from temporary employment into permanent employment 
than from school to permanent employment. 
The paper investigates for a sample of Flemish school leavers whether a 
temporary employment spell at the start of the career has a positive or 
negative impact on the transition rate into permanent employment. Our 
analytical benchmark is the case of a direct transition from 
unemployment to permanent employment. Do individuals who start with 
fixed-term employment reach permanent employment more or less 
quickly? 
The fundamental problem in this type of study is that school-leavers who 
enter temporary employment are probably not a random group. They are 
likely to differ in their characteristics from school-leavers who do not 
enter temporary employment. If this is the case, simple comparison of 
transition rates for the two groups would not only capture the impact of 
temporary employment, but also the effect of the different characteristics. 
In order to control for selective participation in temporary employment, 
we use a large set of explanatory variables especially collected to study 
school-leavers. Furthermore we apply advanced statistical methods to test 
for the presence of selection in unobserved characteristics. Based on our 
statistical test, we conclude that given our data, there is no support for 
selection in unobserved characteristics.  
Simulation exercises give insight into temporary employment effects 
changing over time elapsed since school-leaving. In the short run 
temporary employment delays transition to permanent employment. But 
in the long run temporary employment acts as stepping stone and reduces 
the time required before reaching permanent employment. From this 
perspective fixed-term contracts at career entry appear as beneficial. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
Schulabgänger beginnen das Arbeitsleben häufig mit einem befristeten 
Arbeitsverhältnis. Diese Befristungen werden häufig kritisiert. Arbeit-
geber könnten hiermit ihre relativ starke Verhandlungsposition gegenüber 
den Berufseinsteigern ausnutzen. Andererseits könnten Befristungen auch 
die Funktion eines Sprungbretts zu unbefristeten Arbeitsverhältnissen 
übernehmen. Dies wäre der Fall, wenn Berufseinsteiger mit befristetem 
Arbeitsverhältnis schneller einen unbefristeten Vertrag erhielten als 
Absolventen, die nicht mit einem befristeten Vertrag starten. 
Diese Studie untersucht anhand einer Stichprobe von Schulabgängern aus 
Flandern (Belgien), ob ein befristeter Vertrag am Beginn des 
Erwerbslebens die Übergangsraten in unbefristete Stellen erhöht oder 
vermindert. Die analytische Referenzmarke ist der direkte Übergang aus 
der Arbeitslosigkeit in unbefristete Beschäftigung. 
Das zentrale Problem der Analyse ist, dass sich die arbeitmarktrelevanten 
Charakteristika von Absolventen, die befristete Beschäftigung 
aufnehmen, von denen der Absolventen, die dies nicht tun, vermutlich 
systematisch unterscheiden. Handelt es sich um selektierte Gruppen, 
misst der einfache Vergleich der Übergangsraten nicht nur die Wirkung 
der befristeten Beschäftigung, sondern auch den Effekt der Selektion. 
Um selektionsbedingte Verzerrungen auszuschalten, nutzen wir eine sehr 
große Zahl von Kontrollvariablen, die eigens für die Untersuchung des 
Übergangs vom Schul- in das Erwerbsleben gesammelt wurden. Dass in 
den Daten Selektion in unbeobachtbaren Charakteristika vorliegt, kann 
anhand moderner statistischer Testmethoden ausgeschlossen werden. 
Anhand von Simulationen lässt sich die unterschiedliche Wirkung 
befristeter Beschäftigung in Abhängigkeit von der Zeit herausarbeiten. 
Unsere Ergebnisse sprechen dafür, dass Befristungen kurzfristig den 
Übergang in permanente Beschäftigung verzögern können. Langfristig 
erweist sich befristete Beschäftigungsverhältnisse aber als Sprungbrett für 
eine unbefristete Stelle. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
In this paper we provide a study on the transition from school to working life. More precisely, we 
study the effect of a transition to temporary employment on the transition rate into permanent 
employment for unemployed school-leavers. In the following, temporary employment is defined as 
employment with a fixed-term employment contract.  In contrast, permanent employment refers to 
contracts where the end of the employment relationship is not fixed in advance. School-leavers are 
those who leave the educational system either after primary, secondary or tertiary education.  We try 
to answer the question whether temporary employment is a stepping stone to permanent 
employment for unemployed school-leavers.  Using a Flemish sample, we contrast the case of 
temporary employment to the hypothetical case of a direct transition from unemployment to 
permanent employment. In order to control for selective participation in temporary employment we 
include a large set of explanatory variables. We apply the AIC-information criterion to select the 
appropriate specification for the unobserved heterogeneity. Based on the information criteria we 
conclude that given our data, there is no support for a model with selection in unobserved 
characteristics. We conduct simulation exercises in order to provide insights into the dynamic 
development of the effect of temporary work for unemployed school-leavers.  We find that in the long 
run temporary employment acts as a stepping stone for unemployed school-leavers and decreases 
the duration until permanent employment. 
 
Youth labour market problems 
One of the most striking labour market developments of recent decades has been the declining 
economic status of young workers (Blanchflower and Freeman, 2000). In most Western European 
countries this is reflected in high unemployment rates. Table 1 illustrates that the unemployment-rate 
is much higher for young workers than for the rest of the active population.  In 2005 the 
unemployment rate of people younger than 25 was more than two times higher than the 
unemployment rate for the over 25 years’ old, in most European countries. In Flanders, the region we 
focus on throughout this paper, the unemployment rate has even been three times higher for young 
people than for the older ones. 
 
Table 1: Unemployment in Europe and Flanders (2005) 
(Eurostat, LFS adjusted series) 
(%)
EU-15 Flanders
-25 year 16.9 14.2
+25 year 7.1 4.5
2005
 
The potential implications of the described phenomenon for the young workers and for the society as 
a whole are important. High unemployment rates reflect a large underutilisation of human resources. 
Furthermore, unemployment at young age might have a permanent influence on the future labour 
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market prospects of the workers. The transition period from school to work marks an important step 
in life and substantially influences the subsequent labour market performance and well-being of the 
school-leavers (SONAR, 2001).3   
 
Besides the fact that young workers have problems to enter employment, they enter the labour 
market often through temporary employment (Ryan, 2001). In Europe, about 40% of the workers, 
younger than 25, are employed with a temporary contract (32% in Belgium).  For the older working 
population (25 years and older) only 11% of the employees are temporary ones (6.5% in Belgium) 
(Eurostat, EU-15, LFS series, 2005).  
Research on the workers motives behind the acceptance of temporary employment has shown that 
most workers in temporary employment would prefer a permanent contract (e.g. De Witte et al., 2001 
and Guest, 2004). Moreover, this branch of literature highlights the fact that workers accept 
temporary employment contracts because they hope to enhance their chances of becoming 
permanently employed in the long term (Declerck et al., 2006). 
 
Contribution to literature 
Both phenomena, the high unemployment rate and the high incidence of temporary employment for 
young workers, point to the importance of the transition from school to working life. In depth 
knowledge of the dynamics of the transition from school to work is crucial in order to understand and 
tackle the youth labour market problems. It is one contribution of this paper that we investigate the 
role of temporary employment for unemployed school-leavers.  
Despite the relevance of this subject, the existing literature on school-leavers has left out either the 
aspect of temporary employment or the aspect of unemployment.  Among the first type of study, that 
investigates the transition from unemployment to work without considering temporary employment 
are papers by Bradley and Taylor (1991), Bratberg and Nilsen (2000), Nielsen et al. (2003) and 
Vanoverberghe et al. (2008) - respectively for the UK, Norway, Denmark and Flanders.  
The other branch of the literature on school leavers investigates the role of temporary employment, 
without considering the issue of unemployment: For example McGinnity et al. (2005) found no 
difference in the probability of future employment irrespective of whether or not one starts in 
temporary or permanent employment, for Germany.  Scherer (2004) considers the occupational 
status of future employment. She founds reduced chances for access to “higher” positions for 
starters in temporary employment for Germany and higher unemployment risks for starters in 
temporary employment in Italy.  
Remarkably, none of the existing studies on school-leavers investigates the role of temporary 
employment for the transition from unemployment to work.  We want to fill the gap by answering the 
question whether temporary employment helps unemployed school-leavers to integrate into the 
                                                 
3 In a paper by Nordström Skans (2004) on the Swedish youth labour market, it has been argued that post-
graduation unemployment has a long-lasting negative effect on the labour market performance.  
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labour market.  Furthermore, our paper is the first one that provides insights on the dynamic 
development of the effect of temporary employment for school-leavers.  
 
We investigate if temporary employment is a stepping stone towards permanent employment or not. 
To answer this question we use duration models that are closely related to Abbring and van den Berg 
(2003) in the sense that we use their framework to test for the presence of selection in unobserved 
heterogeneity. We apply a multi-state grouped duration model for our empirical investigation. We 
model the transition from unemployment to temporary employment, from temporary employment to 
permanent employment and from unemployment directly to permanent employment.  The transition 
rates are specified in a flexible way and are allowed to depend on observed and unobserved 
characteristics of the school-leavers as well as on the elapsed time spent in the respective labour 
market state.  In order to derive estimates of the causal effect of temporary employment over time, 
we apply simulation methods.  We estimate the different transitions for unemployed school-leavers 
using survey data for Flanders, a region that covers the Northern part of Belgium.  These Flemish 
data have been especially collected to investigate the entry into the labour market for school-leavers 
and contain a large set of variables. Many of these variables are not available in other surveys or in 
administrative data sets.  These data allow us to construct the labour market trajectory on a monthly 
basis. The database is exceptionally rich and contains a whole range of explanatory variables that 
are likely to have explanatory power for the transition from school into the labour market. For 
example, the dataset contains information on parents’ education, migration background, membership 
in clubs, financial independence, internships, the presence of a driving license, regional 
unemployment, the pollster’s impression of the respondent and so forth. 
 
We provide a causal evaluation of the effect of temporary employment on the time it takes to find a 
permanent job.  For this purpose, we contrast the duration until entering a permanent job when 
taking a temporary job to the counterfactual duration that it would take for a direct transition from 
unemployment to permanent employment.  This differs from the majority of the existing literature 
concerning temporary employment.  Most papers consider the probability of getting a temporary or 
permanent contract4, the subsequent labour market outcomes of temporary workers5, or estimate the 
duration in temporary employment before finding a permanent job.6  This last category of papers 
starts from a temporary job as initial state and computes the duration until a permanent one, whereas 
we consider unemployment after leaving school as the initial state.    Besides Booth et all. (2002), 
D’Addio and Rosholm (2005) and Guëll and Petrongolo (2007), all others only discuss the 
determinants and possible explanations for the duration to a permanent job. Gagliarduccis (2005) 
focus is on the effect of repeated temporary contracts on the probability of finding a permanent job.  
                                                 
4 E.g. Amuedo-Dorantes (2000), Morris & Vekker (2001), Caparros Ruiz & Navarra Gomez (2003), Giesecke & 
Gross, (2003) and Kahn (2005). 
5 E.g. Korpi & Levin (2001), Booth et all. (2002), Giesecke & Gross, (2003), Steijn & Need (2003), Michaud & 
Roger (2003), McGinnity et al.(2004), Scherer (2004), Casquet and Cunyat (2004). 
6 E.g.. Booth et all. (2002), D’Addio & Rosholm (2005) , Gagliarducci (2005) and  Guëll and Petrongolo (2007). 
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He distinguishes transitions from a temporary job to a permanent one with transitions from repeated 
temporary jobs to a permanent one. Different from his approach, we compare the duration to 
permanent employment (for individuals taking a temporary employment) with the counterfactual 
situation of staying unemployed. In addition, our paper provides the detailed time-path for the 
development of the effect over time.  
Our type of study has received little attention.  Research of this kind for Germany (Hagen, 2003), the 
Netherlands (Zijl et al., 2004) and Italy (Ichino et al., 2005) has indicated that temporary work 
accelerates the transition to permanent work in these countries; however, non of these studies 
focuses on school-leavers. 
Two different methods have been used in the literature to answer our question: propensity score 
matching and duration analysis.  Hagen (2003) and Ichino et al. (2005) use the first method, which 
relies on the presence of all relevant characteristics in the used data.7 As a result of this requirement, 
applying matching methods for the analysis of school-leavers would be troublesome in many cases, 
since most available data bases suffer from a lack a comprehensive set of explanatory variables. 
Furthermore, even in the presence of big data-sets it seems to be advisable to test if unobserved 
characteristics affect both the probability to get a temporary contract and the probability of getting a 
permanent contract. Duration models, conditional on assumptions (discussed in section 5), provide 
the means to test for selection in unobserved characteristics.  
 
To summarize our contribution, this is the first paper that investigates the role of temporary 
employment on unemployed school-leavers. This paper provides details on the dynamic 
development of the effect, offers an empirical analysis based on a convincing data base for the 
investigation of the entry into the labour market and contains a formal check for the existence of 
remaining selection in unobserved characteristics. 
 
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows.  Section 2 provides some theoretical 
consideration. Afterwards, section 3 gives background information on the situation and legislation 
concerning school-leavers and temporary employment in Flanders.  Section 4 provides details about 
the used data and the considered sample.  In section 5 we explain the econometric model and in 
section 6 we provide the results.  Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical considerations 
 
Economic theory provides arguments that either support or reject the hypothesis that temporary 
employment is a stepping stone for unemployed school-leavers.  
The human capital of school-leavers is likely to shrink in unemployment periods. This is in line with 
human capital theory assuming that human capital is depreciated when staying unemployed (Becker, 
                                                 
7 See Hagen (2003) or Ichino et al. (2005) for more details about the propensity score matching approach. 
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1986).  Temporary employment can be a way to maintain or increase the stock of human capital 
through work experience for school-leavers.  
Another argument that supports the view that temporary employment is a stepping stone builds on 
the importance of professional networks. When young people leave school, their professional 
networks tend to be small or non-existing.  Taking a temporary job is likely to enlarge the network of 
young workers and thus offers more opportunities to get a permanent job.   
For employers it is not always obvious whether the school-leavers are the persons their companies 
need.  Therefore they might use temporary contracts as a screening device.  The employer can hire 
the employee on a temporary basis in order to learn something about the actual productivity of the 
worker and keep only productive workers permanently.  Besides the screening theory (Stiglitz, 1975), 
also signalling theory (Spence, 1973) offers an argument in favour of the stepping stone effect of 
temporary employment for unemployed school-leavers. By working in a temporary job they can 
signal to future employers both their willingness and their ability to work. Since it is not possible to 
infer the productivity of unemployed school-leavers from their past labour market trajectory, this 
argument can be expected to have more explanatory power in the case of school-leavers than in the 
case of experienced workers.  
Even though the mentioned arguments are in favour of temporary employment, there are also a 
couple of theoretical arguments that suggest that temporary employment may prevent a fast 
integration into permanent employment. In the dual labour market theory, temporary employment is 
seen as employment in the bad market segment.  According to this hypothesis, the labour market 
consists of two tiers: the primary segment with “good jobs” and the secondary, inferior labour market 
segment with “bad jobs”. (Piore, 1970).  The “confinement” proposition of the dual labour market 
theory says that there is little if any mobility between the primary and secondary sector and that 
disadvantaged workers in secondary segments are trapped in bad jobs.  As a consequence school-
leavers who accept a temporary employment would remain in temporary employment. 
A possible explanation for the limited mobility between both segments is negative feedback effects: 
due to working in secondary jobs, people acquire bad work habits and become unsuited to work in 
the primary sector (Tauban and Wachter, 1986). Also, signalling could provide an explanation for the 
low mobility between the two labour market segments. If temporary employment provides a bad 
signal to potential employers, e.g. since the worker didn’t succeed to get a “good, permanent job”, 
then a worker in temporary employment could be trapped. However, for young workers temporary 
employment is less likely to play an important role as a bad signal, since their labour market history is 
shorter and thus less informative.8   
To sum up, economic theory provides a couple of arguments on how temporary employment affects 
the transition into the labour market. However, the direction of the total effect remains unclear and it 
                                                 
8 In line with the dual labour market theory, empirical research confirms that, compared to permanent workers, 
temporary jobs in Flanders are associated with bad job characteristics; for example lower wages (Sels et al, 
2002) and a lower training probability (Forrier et al., 2003; Verhaest et al., 2006).  There are comparable results 
for other European countries (e.g. Booth et al., 2002).  
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is an empirical question in which way temporary employment affects the integration of school-leavers 
into the labour market. 
 
3.  The Flemish context 
 
Flemish school-leavers  
In Flanders there is compulsory education until the age of eighteen.  From the age of fifteen or 
sixteen only part-time schooling is compulsory.  Student jobs during vocational training are 
considered as being part of the educational career; as a consequence we do not consider these jobs 
as the first job for school-leavers.  In Belgium, there is no obligatory military service and school-
leavers enter the labour market directly after the end of schooling.  
Different from other countries, in Belgium school-leavers can claim unemployment benefits. Roughly 
speaking these unemployment benefits provide a flat payment scheme that is mainly a function of the 
family status and that does not expire. The level of the benefits is relatively low and just above social 
benefits. Before an unemployed school-leaver is entitled to full unemployment benefits, there is the 
so-called waiting period. This period starts with the registration at the employment office after the end 
of the last school year.  During this period (233 days for school-leavers between 18 and 26 year) the 
unemployed school-leaver only gets a waiting period benefit, which is lower than the regular 
unemployment benefits.  The waiting period runs during working days.  Therefore, school-leavers 
have an incentive to register at the employment office after leaving school, even if they have already 
an employment contract.  This gives them the advantage to claim unemployment benefits earlier in 
the event of a subsequent unemployment spell.   
Similar to other European welfare states, Flanders applies active labour market policies to integrate 
unemployed school-leavers into the labour market. The most important labour market policy for 
unemployed Flemish school-leavers is the “First Job Agreement”.  This can be a temporary contract, 
a permanent contract or an active labour market program9.  For larger companies (more than 50 
employees) there is an obligation to achieve a youth quota of at least 3% of their work force.  In 
exchange, under certain conditions, the employers are entitled to reductions in the social security 
contributions. The reductions can also be bigger, and combined sometimes with other programs 
when the employer hires poorly qualified young people or long-term unemployed. 10
 
Employment contracts in Flanders  
                                                 
9 We come back to the treatment of active labour market programs in section 5. 
10 The amount of the reduction differs a lot.  In 2004 the system was simplified to a  maximum reduction of 1.000 
€ every quarter during the first 8 quarters and 400 € for all the following quarters until the maximum age of 26. 
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Labour regulation distinguishes two types of employment contracts: with or without time stipulation.  
The latter are permanent contracts.11 Employment contracts with a time stipulation are what we call 
‘temporary employment’.   
As in many European countries also in Belgium, the application of temporary employment contracts 
is limited by law.  A limited number of consecutive temporary employment contracts, between the 
same employee and employer, are possible for a maximum of 3 years.  Other employment contracts 
are considered as being permanent, unless they are justified through the temporary nature of the job 
or other legal reasons.  
A temporary contract has a starting date and an ending date and ends automatically on the date 
agreed. This means that there is no dismissal procedure involved. An option to terminate the contract 
before the final date has to be an explicit part of the contract.  A permanent labour contract can be 
ended by one of the parties whereby the legal terms of notice need to be respected (depending on 
the duration of the contract).  The rules are different for employers and employees. The employee 
has the right to end the contract without a procedure, but he or she has to respect the legal and 
agreed determination period, which usually is a one-month notice minimum.   
 
Compared with other European countries the difference in employment protection legislation 
between temporary and permanent contracts is more balanced in Flanders (OECD, 2004). Overall in 
Europe, strict regulation for temporary contracts tends to go together with strict regulation for 
permanent contracts.  For Flanders one can notice that this balance is to a little extent in favour of 
more regulation on temporary employment and less protection of permanent workers (OECD, 2004). 
During the last decade there is a growing percentage of temporary employment in Flanders despite 
the absence of major changes in the employment protection legislation. 
 
 
4. Data on Flemish school-leavers 
 
Survey data 
We use a survey database for Flanders (SONAR), collected to study the transition from education to 
the labour market.  Therefore the database is exceptionally rich on labour market information for 
school-leavers in their first working experiences.  It contains monthly information on the labour 
market status from the moment one leaves school until the moment of the last interview as well as a 
whole range of socio economic variables.12  As a consequence, the dataset contains information, 
which is often not available in other samples (e.g. information on internships, student jobs, driving 
                                                 
11 Permanent employment contracts can specify a probationary period, during which the worker can be fired if 
unsatisfactory without severance payment.  Employment under probation is thus (possibly) part of a permanent 
contract and not considered as a temporary contract. 
12 Since the data set contains monthly information for some key variables, we have the contract type for every 
job.  This is an advantage compared to Zijl et al. (2004), who use a similar method (cfr. supra), because they 
have to infer the contract type of jobs between interview times from other variables. 
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license and club membership).  In these data, employment experience is registered as soon as it 
exceeds one hour per week, for a job-duration of at least one month. 
 
The data collection has been accomplished in a longitudinal follow-up design. This study will use two 
cohorts of young adults, born in 1976 or 1978. The adults in our sample were questioned a first time 
when they were 23 years old and a second time when they were 26 years old.13  The samples were 
randomly selected and trained interviewers performed the oral interviews at the home of the 
interviewees. The dataset is thus based on self-reported information of the respondents. The face to 
face interviews also allowed collecting information on the impression that the interviewer received 
from the school-leaver.  
 
The SONAR group investigated the representativity of the database (SONAR, 2000). With respect to 
gender and family formation the sample is roughly representative. In line with responses in other 
surveys, lower educated, unemployed and respondents from lower social classes are slightly 
underrepresented. Comparing the sample with respect to additional characteristics is close to 
impossible because of a lack of comparable or representative data.  
 
Sample  
Since we are interested in a causal analysis for unemployed school-leavers special care has to be 
taken when selecting the sample. There are two related issues that have to be considered. The first 
concerns unreliable information on the unemployment-status at the end of schooling and the second 
issue concerns the danger that anticipation of future employment could flaw the causal analysis.  
First some words about unreliable information on the unemployment status. In Belgium, as in most 
other countries, schooling typically ends by the start of the summer. For example, in our data, about 
90% of the school-leavers end school in June. However the first employment-spells for school-
leavers typically start only after a break of 2-3 month. In fact, even though many school-leavers have 
already an employment contract at the end of school,  most of their jobs do not start during the 
summer months, e.g. because employers are reluctant since many of their employees are in holidays 
anyway and new arriving school-leavers typically need some guidance when they start working. Also 
school-leavers might think that they deserve summer-holidays after the final exams. As a result, 
many of the school-leavers report a short period of inactivity or unemployment directly at the end of 
schooling – even though most of them already have an employment contract at the end of schooling. 
Actually, for institutional reasons the school-leavers might register as unemployed and report this in 
the questionnaire, even though they are not actively looking for a job in this period. To summarize, 
the information on unemployment during the months directly after the end of schooling are likely to 
be not reliable.14  
The second issue is about the possible consequences of the described phenomena for a causal 
analysis in longitudinal studies.  We argued above that it is likely that directly after leaving school, a 
                                                 
13The response rate for the follow up interviews was about 70%. . 
14 These arguments apply to most westernized countries and have been largely ignored in the existing literature. 
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part of the reported “unemployed” school-leavers are actually waiting for their first job to start. Here, 
the potential problem comes from the fact that waiting or unemployment have different behavioural 
implications on search behaviour and consequently on labour market outcomes.15 Technically 
speaking the problem arises since these behavioural consequences are conditional on future 
outcomes of the realisation of the labour market transition. This is a form of endogeneity, which is 
known to flaw estimation results. The described problem is likely to be present for a considerable part 
of school leavers during the first months after leaving school.  
 
In order to avoid the described problems and to make sure that the school-leavers are actually 
unemployed, we restrict the sample to school-leavers who are unemployed in the third month after 
leaving school.16  This has the drawback that the obtained results are all conditional on this 
restriction. However we argue that the advantages in terms of validity of the data and the reliability of 
our results largely outweigh this drawback. This approach leaves us with a sample of 1542 
unemployed school-leavers.   
 
Overview of the variables 
To explain the transition from unemployment to employment and in order to control for selective 
participation in temporary employment, one should include all relevant variables into the empirical 
model. In addition to variables like gender, age and nationality, which are available in virtually every 
data-set on workers labour market performance, there are many other variables that are likely to be 
important.  
For example human capital theory (Becker, 1964) implies that investment into education increases 
productivity. In addition education and work experience could be a signal for the effort and 
professional ambition of school-leavers. Since productivity, effort and ambition are likely to be 
important for the transition into the labour market, it is important to integrate variables on the 
education of the young workers. The dataset contains the educational level and if the education is of 
the vocational type or not. Also information on apprenticeships during education and on student work 
during education is likely to be important to explain the transition from schooling into the labour 
market. This type of information should cover specific forms of work-experience, the general attitude 
towards the work and the motivation of the young workers.  
Social capital and network theories (see, e.g. Montgomery, 1991) explain the importance of informal 
networks to receive (more) job offers.  Respondents with a good social background and thus better-
developed informal networks are likely to receive more job offers.  The dataset contains detailed 
information on the family background of the workers, such as the number of brothers and sisters but 
                                                 
15 The empirical test of Flinn and Heckman (1983) support our view that unemployed are more actively looking 
for a job. Flinn and Heckman tested empirically whether the exit rate from unemployment to employment is the 
same as that from out of the labour force to employment, while examining observed and unobserved individual 
differences in explanatory variables.   
16 Another way to rationalize this decision is to simply consider the school-holidays at the end of the last year at 
school as being part of the period in education.  
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also the nationality of the grandmother, indicating migration background and the educational level of 
the mother.   
Information on the financial independence and financial needs are likely to be important to explain 
search intensity and preferences for certain types of jobs. The database contains information that is 
directly related to the financial situation of the school-leaver. One variable is covering financial 
independence of the parents. Moreover we know if the young worker lives together with his partner 
and the number of children he/she has.   
Variables that are likely to cover personality traits are that on membership in clubs, a variable that 
may reveal information on social capital or social integration and the variable that contains the 
pollsters’ impression of the respondent.  The pollsters had to answer 8 questions to get insight in how 
they experience the respondent. Therefore, the pollsters have to score the respondents to which 
account they are energetic, active, calm, friendly, cheerful, open, optimistic and motivated to answer.  
Using factor analysis we created a single variable indicating how others perceive the respondents.  
We only used the items calm, friendly and open since we believe that these variables are unlikely to 
change over time. Variables like optimistic or motivated could also be the outcome of the labour 
market history. Therefore, we exclude these variables to avoid endogeneity bias. 
The welfare typology of the area the young worker lives in is another variable that may cover 
otherwise unobserved characteristics, since the social network, the personal characteristics and 
values of people are likely to be correlated with the type of living area (rural, urban industrial or 
residential area).  
The presence of a driving license should have an effect on the transition into the labour market since 
it enhances the mobility of the workers. Moreover, in Europe, to acquire a driving license one needs 
a substantial amount of money and specific skills. 
Finally, the data-set contains the regional, time-varying unemployment rates to reflect difference in 
the economic performance of the different regions.      
  
Differences in descriptive statistics 
In the following sub-section we focus only on some key differences and similarities between 
unemployed school-leavers who have a transition from unemployment to temporary employment and 
unemployed school-leavers with a (direct) transition from unemployment to permanent employment. 
The complete table with the statistics of all explanatory variables can be found in appendix 2. 
 
The most remarkable difference is with respect to gender.  There is a large preponderance of women 
over men in the subgroup of the workers with a transition to temporary employment.  In the other 
subgroup (transition to permanent employment) men have a clear preponderance.  The variables 
referring to ethnicity, social background of the individual and the number of siblings are very similar in 
both groups.  
Workers with a lower tertiary degree are overrepresented, in the subgroup of temporary workers.  
The number of respondents with a higher secondary degree is higher in the subgroup of permanent 
workers.  Among temporary workers the fraction of ending education in a vocational type (6.5%) is 
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lower than among permanent workers.  The distribution for the welfare typology also differs 
significantly between both subgroups.  A transition to temporary employment seems more common 
in urbanised areas. Among the school-leavers in residential areas the fraction of a transition to 
permanent employment is higher than among those with a transition to temporary employment. 
 
 
5. Econometric model 
 
The idea behind our approach is to consider a transition to temporary employment as a treatment 
that applies to unemployed school-leavers, and evaluate if this treatment accelerates the transition 
into permanent employment, compared to the counterfactual situation without a treatment. In 
different words, we investigate if the transition rates into permanent employment after entering 
temporary employment are higher or lower than they would have been in the hypothetical case of no 
entry into temporary employment. To answer this question one has to take into account that 
unemployed school-leavers who have a transition into temporary employment and those who have a 
direct transition into permanent employment may have different observed and unobserved 
characteristics. Without controlling for these characteristics it would be impossible to tell if the 
observed labour market outcomes are due to the specific characteristics or due to the effect of the 
transition into temporary employment. Furthermore, we estimate how these effects change over time. 
Figure 1 in the appendix illustrates this idea.  
 
In our empirical model, unemployed school-leavers either have a transition to temporary employment 
or to permanent employment. For school-leavers who have a transition into temporary employment, 
we consider the subsequent duration between first entry into temporary employment and a transition 
into permanent employment. The duration between a transition into temporary employment and a 
transition into permanent employment is allowed to be composed of several temporary employment 
or unemployment periods. Consequently, we allow for cases where it is possible that the treated 
school leavers are trapped in a sequence of temporary employment and unemployment spells after 
their first transition into temporary employment.  
 
The observed spells can be right censored for various reasons. If we do not observe a transition out 
of the respective labour market state then the ongoing spell is censored at the end of the observation 
period. Moreover, if a worker has a transition into an active labour market program, self-employment 
or full time education, then the corresponding spells are right censored at the end of the time-period 
just before this transition is observed.17  
 
                                                 
17 Alternatively one could fully integrate these states into a transition model with an extended state-space which, 
however is beyond the scope of this paper. Fitting multivariate, multi-spell data with many states is 
computationally very demanding and is likely to provide only limited benefit for the analysis in this paper.  
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In order to identify the causal effect of a transition into temporary employment on the duration until a 
transition into permanent employment we apply a model that is closely related to the “timing of 
events” approach (Abbring and van den Berg, 2003). Roughly speaking the “timing of events 
approach” is able to solve the endogeneity problem caused by selective treatment without the need 
of exclusion restrictions. Instead, the variation in the timing of the transition to temporary employment 
is exploited, in order to identify the effect on the duration of interest.18 This is achieved in a duration 
model, where the selection process and the transition of interest can be related via multivariate 
unobserved heterogeneity. However, even though the evaluation idea is inspired by the timing of 
events approach, given our data, it turned out that a specification with independent transitions is 
applicable, i.e. given our data we do not find support for selection in unobserved characteristics. With 
independent transitions the assumptions on the variation of the explanatory variables that are 
required for identification are weaker, as outlined in the next subsection.     
 
To estimate the causal effect of temporary employment, we have to consider that the characteristics 
of school-leavers who have a transition to temporary employment might be systematically different 
from those with a direct transition to permanent employment without intermediate temporary 
employment. Therefore, we have to take observed and unobserved characteristics of the individuals 
into account.  To control for selection in observed characteristics, we include a large set of 
explanatory variables in our duration model.  These variables (cf. appendix 2) include individual 
characteristics, information on the socio economic background of the individuals and information 
about the local labour market conditions. In order to control for selection in unobserved 
characteristics we proceed in two steps. First we test the presence of remaining unobserved 
heterogeneity for each of the transition rates separately. Only if unobserved heterogeneity is present 
for both of the two destination states (transition into temporary employment and transitions into 
permanent employment) it is necessary to estimate a model with dependent unobserved 
characteristics between the transition rates, in a second step.   
 
Identification of the mixed proportional hazard model 
In this section we are going to discuss some key assumptions for the identification of causal effects 
within the empirical model. We proceed as follows, first we summarize the identification assumptions 
for the identification of causal effects in multivariate mixed proportional hazard models (i.e. timing of 
events). This discussion is useful since most of the requirements hold for our final specification. 
Secondly, we shortly outline in which way the identification assumptions can be relaxed in the case 
of independent transitions.19   
                                                 
18 The identification of the “timing-of-events” approach relies on various assumptions (Abbring and van den 
Berg, 2003). Several of these assumptions are discussed in the next subsection.    
19 For a detailed discussion of the identification of duration models and the timing-of-events approach we refer to 
Van den Berg (2001) and  Abbring and Van den Berg (2003). 
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In order to be able to identify this model, it is necessary to assume independence between the vector 
of the unobserved heterogeneity terms and the observed characteristics.20 Furthermore, we need 
exogenous variation in the timing of the transitions. From the descriptive statistics it is clear that there 
is variation in the timing of the transitions for the different transitions. Moreover, it seems reasonable 
that there exists considerable randomness in the timing of the job offers for unemployed workers and 
it is not hard to imagine that two otherwise identical school-leavers have different unemployment 
durations because one of them had good and the other one bad luck. We also would like to point out 
that the idea of random job offer rates is widely used in economic theory, e.g. in the job-search 
literature (e.g. Mortensen, 1986). 
Another assumption which is required for identification is the absence of anticipation of the timing of 
treatment. To satisfy the condition of non-anticipation one either needs that workers do not know the 
exact moment of a transition to temporary employment in advance or that they do not change their 
job search behaviour conditional on this information. As explained above, the plausibility that the 
“absence of anticipation” assumption is fulfilled depends also on the selected sample. For example, 
in a sample of all school-leavers one could expect to have some school-leavers who got a job offer 
already during schooling time. Since jobs for school-leavers often start within a short period after the 
end of schooling it is likely that some of these school-leavers have a short “unemployment” period 
before they start working on their first job. But the a-priori knowledge of the timing of the job-start 
could lead to anticipation for this group.    
For a sample of unemployed school-leavers, as used in this paper, where we condition on 
unemployment for at least three consecutive months after the end of school, it is less likely that the 
exact timing of a transition into temporary employment is known much in advance. By definition, 
these workers are still unemployed in the third month after the end of schooling. For this group it is 
unlikely that they have accepted a job offer during schooling time, since these jobs would typically 
start during the first three months after the end of schooling.21 For the school-leavers in this sample it 
is consequently unlikely that anticipation effects play a noteworthy role.  
Moreover, in the case of multivariate mixed proportional hazard models, we have to include at least 
two continuous explanatory variables that comprise sufficient variation, that affect the competing 
transition rates in different ways and that are not collinear. In the present paper we include several 
continuous explanatory variables: the regional unemployment rate, the subjective impression that the 
pollster has from the school-leaver and the age of the worker. Arguments in the literature on the 
identification of MMPH models suggest that these variables are useful for identification. In the case of 
independent mixed proportional hazard models as applied for the final results, continuous variables 
                                                 
20 In the absence of repeated observation of the same transition for one individual, this type of assumption is 
required for the identification of the parameters that are associated to the observed characteristics in a 
multivariate mixed proportional hazard (MMPH)-model (Abbring, 2006).  
21 In Belgium, like in most European countries, it is not uncommon to have a short spell of inactivity or 
unemployment between the end of schooling and the start of the first employment, even for the case where the 
workers have already accepted a job offer during their schooling time. 
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are not required for identification; see van den Berg (2001). To summarise, we think it is plausible to 
assume that the empirical model is identified for the sample of unemployed school-leavers.  
 
Specification of the likelihood-function  
In our empirical model we allow for three different labour market states: unemployment u, temporary 
employment t and permanent employment p.   The model is of the mixed proportional hazard (MPH) 
type (see also van den Berg 2001).  The equations for the different transition rates are estimated 
simultaneously by means of maximum likelihood. In this model, the observed explanatory variables X 
and the unobserved characteristics V shift the baseline hazard function λ(t)  proportionally.  The 
transition rates out of unemployment can be written as: θ λ β= ⋅ +uq q uq uq q(t x,V ) (t) exp(x ' V ) , for 
.  The transition rate from temporary employment to permanent employment as: { }∈q t,p
θ λ β= ⋅ +tp ut p tp tp p(t t x,V ) (t) exp(x ' V ) . 
We specify a flexible piecewise constant baseline hazards λ α= lm,k(t) exp( ) where k indicates the 
month in origin state l and m is the destination state. We impose the following normalisation: 
α α α= = =up,1 ut,1 tp,1 1. For details on the derivation of the individual likelihood contributions we refer 
to appendix 3. 
The survival rate can be expressed as a function of the transition rate: 
0
( ) exp( ( | ) )
t
q qS t dθ τ τ= − ⋅∫  
and their multivariate equivalent, respectively. Using  to note the survival rate at the end of the 
k-th period in unemployment and for the survival rate at the end of the l-th period after the 
transition to temporary employment, we can write the individual likelihood contribution for the 
grouped duration model as: 
u kS (t )
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(t ) (t )
l S (t ) S (t ) S (t ) S (t )
(t )
S (t ) S (t )
⎤⋅ − ⋅ ⎦t l  (1) 
 
Equation 1 represents all possible trajectories the individual can have in our model.  For notational 
simplicity we do not explicitly write that all components used in equation 1 are conditional on a set of 
explanatory variables.  Censoring in the respective states (unemployment and temporary 
employment) is indicated by and .   A transition to temporary employment is indicated by . uc tc utp
 
For the estimation of the model we proceed in two steps. In a first step we estimate a mixed 
proportional hazard model for each possible transition, independently. We suppose that the 
unobserved component  follows a discrete distribution with a fixed number of mass points 
(Heckman and Singer, 1984). The locations of the discrete mass points as well as the associated 
probability are estimated simultaneously with the other parameters of the model. It is known from the 
literature that the choice of the number of mass points can be a cause of misspecification. In order to 
v
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determine the correct number of mass points we apply penalized maximum likelihood, as suggested 
by the literature; see Baker and Melino (2000) and Gaure et al. (2007). More precisely, we use the 
Akaike information criterion:  log L - (Number of parameters).  
 
In a second step we specify the unobserved heterogeneity terms by a multivariate discrete 
distribution. Van den Berg (2001) argues that, in the case of multivariate mixed proportional hazard 
models, discrete distributions provide flexibility while limiting the computational costs of the 
estimation. We suppose that the unobserved component,  with qv { }∈q t,p , can take  values 
for each possible destination state q.   
n
q1 q2 qnv ,v ,...,v
The resulting individual likelihood contribution can then be written as:  
= =
= ⋅∑∑n nm ab m ta
a 1 b 1
l P l (v , pbv )
                                                
, where  is the associated probability to each combination of these 
values. The probabilities are specified as a multinomial logit. 
abP
 
Details on the specification of the unobserved heterogeneity can be found in Appendix 4.  In the 
given framework, no selection in unobserved characteristics is equivalent to independence between 
the unobserved heterogeneity terms for the two possible transition rates (temporary employment and 
permanent employment).  Finally, the lack of unobserved heterogeneity for at least one of the two 
destination states would indicate the absence of relevant selection in unobserved characteristics, 
since with a degenerated distribution in one transition any correlation between the unobserved 
characteristics of the transitions are ruled out. In this case, either unobserved heterogeneity is not 
important for the selection into temporary employment or unobserved heterogeneity is not important 
to explain the duration of interest (the duration until a transition into permanent employment). In both 





6. Results  
 
Time dependence 
Figure 2 shows the shape of the piecewise constant baseline hazards for the three possible 
transitions. The baseline hazard is informative on the time dependency of the transition rates. All the 
lines in Figure 2 have been computed for the reference individual. In order to find a parsimonious 
specification we started of with a flexible baseline hazard where we allowed for a different value for 
each month. In a second step we imposed parameter restrictions for periods that follow each other 
and whose parameters have not been significantly different from each other.22   
 
22 We tested the validity of the imposed restrictions by means of a likelihood ratio test.  
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In the short run, we see negative duration dependence for the transition out of unemployment 
(transition to temporary employment and to permanent employment).  In the long run there seems to 
be no duration dependence and the transition rates are very low, compared to the start of the spell. 
The transition from temporary employment to permanent employment has two small peaks at 6 and 
12 months. One interpretation for this pattern is that temporary employment contracts are often for 
duration of 6 or 12 months. Guëll and Petrongolo (2007) argue that the timing of the transition from 
temporary to permanent employment can be suggestive of alternative uses of temporary 
employment.  In their baseline hazard rates for Spain, they found spikes around durations of one and 
three years. They put forward that the first one suggests the use of temporary employment as a 
screening device.  The latter could be explained by the legal maximum duration of temporary 
employment.  Different form Spain, in Flanders there is no strictly defined maximum duration for 
temporary employment. In our results there are only early spikes, suggesting the use of temporary 
employment as a screening device in some cases.   
 
Table 2 provides some insights in whether the transition from temporary to permanent employment is 
with the same or another employer.  For 35% the transition from temporary to a permanent contract 
is with the same employer, suggesting that employers use the temporary contract as a screening 
device since especially for school-leavers the productivity of the worker is difficult to assess.  On the 
other hand 65% of unemployed school-leavers starting in a temporary job obtain a permanent 
contract with another employer.  This fits well with the idea that temporary employment acts as a 
signal for employers. 
 
Table 2: Incidence of a change of the employer, when entering permanent employment after 
temporary employment. (in %) 
Same employer as in temporary employment 35.4 % 




No selection in unobserved characteristics 
Our estimates indicate that there is no selection in unobserved characteristics.  As described in the 
previous section we started with the estimation of independent mixed proportional hazard models for 
each transition. Already in this first step, when we go from one point of support (no unobserved 
heterogeneity) to a model with two points of support for the unobserved heterogeneity, the additional 
second mass point for the transition to temporary employment is rejected on the basis of the Akaike   
information criterion (AIC). This result is an indicator for the absence of unobserved heterogeneity in 
this transition.23  To be sure that this is not due to numerical problems we tested different sets of, 
                                                 
23 In a simulation study Gaure et al. (2007) show that the AIC-criterion performs well to find the best specification 
for the unobserved heterogeneity distribution. Alternative criteria as the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) or 
the Hannan-Quinn information Criterion (HQIC) have a stronger penalty for additional parameters when the 
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sometimes extreme, starting values. However, the model always converged to the same parameters, 
independently of the starting values. In order to check the sensitivity of the AIC we also re-estimated 
the model but deliberately left out a significant explanatory variable. In this case, AIC suggests a 
specification with unobserved heterogeneity for the transition into temporary employment.  
The outcome of the specification test is different for the transitions to permanent employment, where 
we find support for a specification of unobserved heterogeneity with two mass points. Since there is 
only unobserved heterogeneity for one of the possible destinations, selection in unobserved 
characteristics is ruled out.   
The suggested conditional independence between durations is an important result. In order to test 
the robustness of this result, we also estimate a multivariate mixed proportional hazard model with 
dependent risks and applied the specification test. Again, the dependent specification has to be 
rejected against a model with a degenerated distribution for the unobserved characteristics in the 
transition into temporary employment, on the basis of the Akaike Information Criterion.  
The reason for the lack of support for a model with dependent unobserved heterogeneity is probably 
the rich dataset.  Variables like driving license, club membership, welfare typology and pollster’s 
impression might capture otherwise unobserved characteristics well.24
In the following all reported results are based on the model where the two possible values for the 
transition to temporary employment ( and ) are restricted to be equal.   t1v t2v
 
Effect of covariates 
Since the focus of this paper is on the effect of temporary employment, the effect of the explanatory 
variables is not our main concern. The main purpose of the covariates is to control for selective 
participation within the given framework. Nevertheless it would be worrying if the covariates would 
have effects on the transition rate that are beyond plausibility. Therefore, we provide only a brief 
summary of the main results. Appendix 5 provides the details for all covariates and transitions.  
Higher education and apprenticeship experience increase the probability of leaving unemployment.  
‘Residential area’ also influences both transition rates out of unemployment but in an opposite way.  
It has a negative effect for the transition to temporary employment, but a positive effect on the 
transition to permanent employment.  A Belgian nationality, student work and living in a traditional 
rural area with recent urbanisation increase the transition from unemployment to temporary 
employment.  A higher unemployment rate reduces the probability of a transition from unemployment 
to permanent employment, whereas club membership increases this probability. “Having a driving 
license” increase all transition probabilities significantly. Female respondents have lower transition 
rates to permanent employment (both out of unemployment and out of temporary employment). A 
more positive pollster’s impression of the respondent has an upwards effect on the transition from 
temporary to permanent employment. In summary, the vast majority of the estimates for the 
explanatory variables are consistent with our expectations. 
                                                                                                                                                      
number of observations exceeds 15. When an additional mass point is rejected on the basis of AIC it would 
consequently also be rejected by BIC and HQIC. 
24 This result suggests that one could also apply a matching approach.  
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 Simulation of time-varying effects 
To get insights into the dynamics of the effects and into what the estimates actually mean, we 
perform simulation exercises.  The general idea is to use the estimates of our model to simulate 
durations to permanent employment for the case of taking a temporary employment and for the 
counterfactual case of staying unemployed.  For details on the simulation procedure we refer to 
Appendix 6.   
 
In a first step we check if our model simulation is able to reproduce the observed outcomes. Figure 3 
shows the fraction of individuals that had already a transition into permanent employment t months 
after the moment they entered temporary employment. The black line shows the fraction that is 
observed in the data, the gray line shows the same fraction, but obtained by the means of simulation.  
In order to obtain Monte-Carlo type confidence bands, we repeated the simulation exercise 400 
times.  The gray line represents the median value of the simulations and its confidence intervals.  It is 
clear from Figure 3 that the simulated outcomes are close to the observed ones.  Notice also that the 
observed fractions are never outside the 95% bounds of our simulations. Overall we conclude that 
the simulation is able to reproduce the observed outcomes rather well.  
 
Since our research question is whether temporary employment helps school-leavers in their 
transition to permanent employment we want to know what would have happened in the hypothetical 
case where the school-leavers did not participate in temporary employment but instead remained in 
unemployment, searching for a direct transition into permanent employment.  Therefore, we add the 
simulation for the hypothetical case of staying unemployed (and not taking temporary employment) to 
Figure 4.  This figure thus presents the simulated fractions (of individuals who had already a 
transition to permanent employment after t months) for unemployed school-leavers who participate in 
temporary employment as well as their counterfactual outcome for a situation without a transition into 
temporary employment.  
In the short run the fraction of individuals in permanent employment after t months is lower, for the 
case of participation in temporary employment, than for the case in which they did not participate in 
temporary employment. In the long run, however, the opposite is true. The fraction of individuals in 
permanent employment after t months is higher for school-leavers who have a transition into 
temporary employment than for the counterfactual situation without this transition. 
 
 
Stepping stone effect 
Figure 5 offers a comprehensible view of the stepping stone effect of temporary employment (i.e. the 
simulated individual difference caused by temporary employment) for unemployed school-leavers.  
Where Figure 4 presents the medians for the simulation (of both cases: participation in temporary 
employment or not), Figure 5 presents the median of the differences.   For each draw of the data we 
computed the difference in both fractions.  The results show a stepping stone effect of temporary 
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employment.  There is a negative effect of temporary employment during the first months, but from 
21 months on workers in temporary employment perform better compared to the hypothetical 
situation where they stayed unemployed and looked for permanent employment directly. 
A negative effect during the first month can be explained by the fact that workers who accept a 
temporary job are initially strongly attached to that job, for example because of contractual reasons.    
In addition to the contractual reasons the negative effect during the first months could be due to the 
limited time temporary workers might have to devote on job search (compared with unemployed 
school-leavers).   
In the long run we find a positive effect of temporary employment for unemployed school-leavers. In 
our analysis we only considered unemployed school-leavers (and not unemployed people in 
general), as we want to estimate the causal effect of temporary employment for school-leavers who 
were actively looking for a job. If we compare our sample with all school-leavers, descriptive statistics 
suggests that our sample contains more low educated school-leavers, more school-leavers with a 
non-Belgian grandmother and less with club membership (reflecting a smaller social network).25 We 
conclude that temporary employment is a stepping stone for unemployed school-leavers, a group 
that has been put into context with high risk for unemployment in the literature.26   
 
 
What happens after the transition to permanent employment? 
We consider the transition to a permanent job as the final labour market state in our model.  In the 
introduction we already presented research results indicating that people prefer a permanent job.  A 
natural question would be to ask if permanent employment after a temporary employment experience  
is stable.  The following descriptive statistics show that the first permanent employment spell is 
comparable, for the case of a preceding temporary employment or preceding unemployment. Table 3 
shows the labour market state 3 months after the transition to permanent employment.  We compare 
respondents who had a direct transition to permanent employment with those who had a transition to 
permanent employment after a temporary job.  This table indicates that 3 months after the start of the 
permanent job 95% of the young people are still in permanent employment.  We observe virtually no 
differences between both groups indicating that those who had a temporary first job and obtain a 
permanent one afterwards indeed succeeded to obtain a comparable employment.  After one year 
still 78% are in permanent employment.  However, since our database contains school-leavers and 
only covers a limited period on the labour market, the percentage of respondents censored before 12 
months is higher (7%).27
 
 
Table 3: Labour market status three months after the transition to permanent employment (in %) 
                                                 
25 12.3% with a grandmother of non Belgian nationality versus 10.2%; 14.9% of lower educated versus 11.6%; 
52.8% club membership versus 58.0%. 
26 See for example Bradley and Taylor (1991), Bratberg and Nilsen (2000),  Nielsen et al. (2003) and 
Vanoverberghe et al. (2008). 
27 These statistics are available from the authors on request. 
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Temporary employment to 
permanent employment  
Permanent employment 94,7 % 95,3 % 
Not working 3,1 % 2,2 % 
Temporary employment 1,4 % 1,0 % 
Censored before 3 months 0,7 % 1,5 % 






In this paper we investigate whether temporary employment acts as a stepping stone for unemployed 
school-leavers.  We compare the duration between the start of temporary employment and a 
transition to permanent employment to the counterfactual duration until permanent employment in 
the absence of temporary employment.   Our contribution to the literature is twofold.  We estimate the 
causal effect of temporary employment controlling for possible selection in observed and unobserved 
characteristics. In addition, we investigate the stepping stone question for unemployed school-
leavers as unemployment and temporary employment are much higher among these younger 
people.   
Our estimation results indicate that there is no selection in unobserved characteristics.  We argue 
that this is due to our exceptionally rich database containing variables, which are often not observed 
(like the pollster’s impression, club membership and driving license).   Simulations are used to 
investigate the causal effect of temporary employment on the transition to permanent employment for 
unemployed school-leavers.  We observe a time varying effect.  Unemployed school-leavers who 
accept a temporary job have a low transition rate into permanent employment at the start of the 
temporary employment spell, which results in a lower fraction of those obtaining a permanent 
contract in the short run (compared with the hypothetical situation where these individuals remained 
unemployed).  In the long run (from 21 months onwards) participants in temporary employment do 
better than the counterfactual situation in which these school-leavers remained unemployed during 
their search for a permanent job.   We thus find a stepping stone effect for unemployed school-
leavers.  Additional descriptive statistics indicate that the first permanent employment is as persistent 
after temporary employment than after a direct transition from unemployment.   
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Appendix 1: Figures 
 
 


























Unemployment to temporary Unemployment to permanent Temporary to permanent
 
Note: starting point is always the start of a spell in a certain state.  For the transitions from 
unemployment to temporary and permanent employment this is the third month after leaving school.  
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                  real data        simulated data 
Note:  starting point is the month of a transition into temporary employment spell 
 95% of the simulations results are within the confidence bounds 
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Note:  starting point is the month of a transition into temporary employment (TE) spell 
 95% of the simulations results are within the confidence bounds 
 
 
























Note:  starting point is the month of a transition into temporary employment spell 
 95% of the simulated differences are within the confidence bounds 
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Appendix 2: Descriptive statistics of explanatory variables 
 
Variables 




Number of observations 1542 451 741 
     
Time independent variables    
Women 53.6% 46.1% 59.8% 
Age in months 253.88 (26.95) 252.33 (26.59) 252.61 (26.01)
Respondent Belgian 97.0% 98.2% 97.8% 
Respondent not Belgian 3.0% 1.8% 2.2% 
Number of brothers and sisters 1.78 (1.51) 1.76 (1.49) 1.72 (1.48) 
Mother primary or lower secondary education 35.9% 33.7% 37.0% 
Mother higher secondary education 29.8% 29.5% 32.0% 
Mother tertiary education 21.7% 25.1% 28.4% 
Mother unknown education 12.6% 11.8% 12.7% 
Grandmother of respondent Belgian 87.7% 91.1% 87.3% 
Grandmother of respondent not Belgian 12.3% 8.9% 12.7% 
Respondent primary education 5.6% 5.3% 5.4% 
Respondent lower secondary education 9.3% 9.5% 9.0% 
Respondent higher secondary education 47.0% 49.9% 47.0% 
Respondent lower tertiary education 19.2% 17.3% 21.6% 
Respondent higher tertiary education 18.9% 18.0% 17.0% 
Any apprenticeships during education 60.6% 63.4% 63.6% 
Any student work during education 36.3% 39.0% 40.2% 
End education in vocational type (part time learning part time 
work) 6.9% 6.9% 6.5% 
Member of any kind of club (youth movement, sports club, 
political movement) 52.8% 56.1% 49.5% 
Pollsters impression of the respondent (only based on: calm, 
friendly and open) 0.038 (0.96) -0.016 (0.99) -0.052 (0.97) 
Welfare typology (based on place of residence at 23)    
Residential areas 11.0% 15.1% 7.8% 
Urban living with average welfare 23.8% 25.1% 20.6% 
Older industrial and working-class residential  areas 28.3% 26.2% 29.1% 
Modern urbanised areas 25.2% 22.1% 27.5% 
Traditional rural areas with recent urbanisation'. 11.7% 11.5% 14.8% 
     
Time dependent variables    
Financial independent of parents at start of U 9.1% 6.2% 9.9% 
Living together at start of U 5.8% 4.9% 6.1% 
Number of children at start of U 0.018 (0.16) 0.016 (0.14) 0.014 (0.15) 
Driving license at start of U 44.3% 46.1% 43.3% 




Financial independent of parents at start of TE   20.6% 
Living together at start of TE   10.0% 
Number of children at start of TE   0.041 (0.25) 
25 
Driving license at start of TE   49.9% 
Unemployment rate at start of TE   9.49 (3.27) 
     
Note:  
- The number of respondents with a transition to permanent employment -PE- (451) and those 
with a transition to temporary employment –TE- (741) together with the 349 censored 
individuals (not yet a transition to temporary employment or permanent employment at the 
moment of the last interview) sum up to the first sample size (1542) 
- “start of U” refers to the start of the unemployment spell, “start of TE” refers to the start of the 
temporary employment 




Appendix 3: The likelihood function of the duration model 
First we consider the state of unemployment. For this state we define two random durations : the 
random duration from unemployment to state q (with
uqT
{ }∈q t,p ).  Similarly for the temporary 
employment state we define : the random duration in temporary employment until permanent 
employment 
tpT
We assume that all individual differences in the joint distribution = ut up tpT (T ,T ,T )  can be characterised 
by explanatory variables X, V where X is observed and V is not. 
 
This joint distribution T|X, V can be expressed in terms of the distributions =ut(T X x,V) , 
=up(T X x,V)  
and = =tp up up(T T t ,X x,V) .  The latter distributions are characterised by their transition 
rates:θut (t x,V) , θup (t x,V)  and θ tp ut(t t ,x,V) . 
Let V =  be a (2 × 1)-vector of unobserved (destination specific) covariates, implying that: t p(V ,V )
θut (t x,V)  = θut t(t x,V ) , 
θup (t x,V)  = θup p(t x,V ) , 
θ tp ut(t t ,x,V)  = θ tp ut p(t t ,x,V ) . 
 
Individual contributions to the likelihood function 
Now, we consider the individual contributions to the likelihood function. 
Consider an individual in the flow sample and consider the likelihood contribution. We can distinguish 
the following cases: 
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1. right censored at unemployment duration :  kt
= > >
= ⋅
1 ut k up
u k
l (V) P(T t ,T t )
S (t )
⋅k        
 
2. leaving first unemployment for temporary employment within [ ]−k 1 kt ,t  and right censored during 






= < ≤ > ⋅
⎧⎪= −⎨ ⎬⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭∑
2 k 1 ut k tp l
ut k
u k 1 u k t l
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l (V) P(t T t ,T t )
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(t )
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 3. leaving unemployment for temporary employment within [ ]−k 1 kt ,t  and leaving for permanent 
employment within [ ]−l 1 lt ,t . 
{ }




= < ≤ < ≤
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Appendix 4: Specification of the heterogeneity distribution 
 
Suppose that can take two values and for each possible destination state q.   { }( ∈qV q t,p q1v q2v
In the case of independence between the unobserved heterogeneity terms for the two possible 
destinations (temporary employment and permanent employment) we estimate the probabilities for 





















Then the joint probabilities for the independent UH can be written as the product of these 
independent probabilities:  
 
= = = = ⋅
= = = = ⋅
= = = = ⋅
= = = = ⋅
11 t t1 p p1 1t 1p
12 t t1 p p2 1t 2p
21 t t2 p p1 2t 1p
22 t t2 p p2 2t 2p
P P(V v ,V v ) p p
P P(V v ,V v ) p p
P P(V v ,V v ) p p
P P(V v ,V v ) p p
   
 
In the case of a model with multivariate dependent UH we have a joint heterogeneity distribution 
with 4 points of support and the following probabilities associated to these: 
 
= = = =
= = = =
= = = =
= = = =
11 t t1 p p1 1
12 t t1 p p2 2
21 t t2 p p1 3
22 t t2 p p2 4
P P(V v ,V v ) p
P P(V v ,V v ) p
P P(V v ,V v ) p
P P(V v ,V v ) p
    
 
Or in a shortcut notation  where each of the elements a, b can take one 
of the values 1,2 (which results in different combinations), each unique combination is named by 
= = = =ab t ta p pb jP P(V v ,V v ) p
22
jp where j = 1,…,4.  













    
 




















Appendix 5: Estimation results  
  b se t 
Transition     
U-TE woman 0.1075 0.0834 1.28897
 age (in months) -0.0036 0.0028 -1.2857
 not Belgian -0.6876 0.2495 -2.7559
 number siblings -0.0534 0.0291 -1.8351
 mother primary or lower secondary education (ref)    
 mother higher secondary education 0.1527 0.0959 1.59228
 mother tertiary education -0.1733 0.1243 -1.3942
 mother unknown education -0.0444 0.1277 -0.3477
 not Belgian grandmother 0.1189 0.1342 0.88599
 primary education -0.2386 0.2063 -1.1566
 lower secondary education -0.2868 0.1502 -1.9095
 higher secondary education (ref)    
 tertiary education 0.683 0.1208 5.65397
 no apprenticeship -0.2304 0.0863 -2.6698
 no student work -0.3944 0.1194 -3.3032
 no vocational training -0.2389 0.1719 -1.3898
 not member club -0.0824 0.0833 -0.9892
 pollster's impression of respondent -0.0521 0.0408 -1.277
 residential areas -0.3844 0.1578 -2.436
 urban living with average welfare -0.1748 0.1123 -1.5565
 older industrial and working-class residential areas (ref)    
 modern urbanised areas 0.0268 0.1121 0.23907
 traditional rural areas with recent urbanisation'. 0.2917 0.128 2.27891
 financial independent of parents -0.0111 0.14 -0.0793
 living together -0.0432 0.1945 -0.2221
 number children -0.2164 0.2679 -0.8078
 driving license 0.2684 0.0933 2.87674
 regional unemployment rate -0.0136 0.0186 -0.7312
 cohort1976 -0.2555 0.1241 -2.0588
     
U-PE woman -0.4188 0.127 -3.2976
 age (in months) -0.0076 0.0041 -1.8537
 not Belgian -0.7749 0.4139 -1.8722
 number siblings 0.0176 0.0424 0.41509
 mother primary or lower secondary education (ref)    
 mother higher secondary education 0.0961 0.1559 0.61642
 mother tertiary education 0.18 0.1703 1.05696
 mother unknown education -0.163 0.1935 -0.8424
 not Belgian grandmother -0.4137 0.2192 -1.8873
 primary education -0.2601 0.2694 -0.9655
 lower secondary education -0.3065 0.2319 -1.3217
 higher secondary education (ref)    
 tertiary education 0.4248 0.1836 2.31373
 no apprenticeship -0.4029 0.1292 -3.1184
 no student work -0.1742 0.169 -1.0308
 no vocational training -0.3898 0.2526 -1.5432
 not member club -0.2706 0.1258 -2.151
 pollster's impression of respondent 0.0327 0.0612 0.53431
 residential areas 0.4006 0.1934 2.07135
 urban living with average welfare 0.136 0.1628 0.83538
 older industrial and working-class residential areas (ref)    
 modern urbanised areas -0.0065 0.1798 -0.0362
 traditional rural areas with recent urbanisation'. 0.0889 0.1985 0.44786
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 financial independent of parents -0.5001 0.2511 -1.9916
 living together -0.0278 0.2982 -0.0932
 number children -0.0186 0.3529 -0.0527
 driving license 0.4401 0.1455 3.02474
 regional unemployment rate -0.0575 0.0269 -2.1375
 cohort1976 -0.1544 0.17 -0.9082
     
TE-PE woman -0.6154 0.1538 -4.0013
 age (in months) -0.0067 0.0051 -1.3137
 not Belgian -0.2699 0.4943 -0.546
 number siblings -0.0773 0.053 -1.4585
 mother primary or lower secondary education (ref)    
 mother higher secondary education 0.0279 0.164 0.17012
 mother tertiary education -0.129 0.1981 -0.6512
 mother unknown education -0.0629 0.2026 -0.3105
 not Belgian grandmother -0.3469 0.2594 -1.3373
 primary education -0.5075 0.3013 -1.6844
 lower secondary education -0.2714 0.2699 -1.0056
 higher secondary education (ref)    
 tertiary education -0.1794 0.2183 -0.8218
 no apprenticeship 0.3336 0.1452 2.29752
 no student work -0.1984 0.2133 -0.9301
 no vocational training 0.2462 0.2853 0.86295
 not member club 0.073 0.1399 0.5218
 pollster's impression of respondent 0.1802 0.073 2.46849
 residential areas 0.5521 0.2669 2.06857
 urban living with average welfare 0.4774 0.1963 2.43199
 older industrial and working-class residential areas (ref)    
 modern urbanised areas 0.0786 0.1865 0.42145
 traditional rural areas with recent urbanisation'. 0.3802 0.2115 1.79764
 financial independent of parents 0.1828 0.1823 1.00274
 living together -0.2385 0.2513 -0.9491
 number children -0.0404 0.4413 -0.0915
 driving license 0.3119 0.1489 2.09469
 regional unemployment rate -0.0393 0.0295 -1.3322
 cohort1976 -0.0222 0.219 -0.1014
     
Baseline hazard    
U-TE month 3 -0.2189 0.123 -1.7797
 month 4-5 -0.2721 0.1149 -2.3681
 month 6-9 -0.5225 0.1177 -4.4393
 month 10 -1.9548 0.4286 -4.5609
 month 11-14 -0.8877 0.1602 -5.5412
 month 15-27 -1.3853 0.1569 -8.8292
 month 28-84 -2.0707 0.2079 -9.9601
     
U-PE month 3 -0.0244 0.1553 -0.1571
 month 4-12 -0.5558 0.1482 -3.7503
 month 13-30 -0.6891 0.2225 -3.0971
 month 31-84 -1.2636 0.3447 -3.6658
     
TE-PE month 2 0.6223 0.4154 1.49807
 month 3-5 0.8814 0.3619 2.43548
 month 6 1.3331 0.3876 3.43937
 month 7-11 0.8445 0.3613 2.33739
 month 12 1.5818 0.4098 3.85993
 month 13-24 1.0227 0.3697 2.7663
30 
 month 25-82 1.1852 0.3967 2.98765
Unobserved heterogeneity    
const U-TE vt1 -1.1686 0.4255 -2.7464
 vt2    
const U-PE vp1 -0.5739 0.6297 -0.9114
 vp2 -2.0984 0.6446 -3.2554
mult TE-PE multiTP -2.7488 0.9411 -2.9208
prob lam1t    
 lam1p -0.1013 0.5185 -0.1954
     
 -Log(likelihood) 6254.35   
 number of parameters 101   




Appendix 6: Simulation of the effect of temporary employment 
For the simulation we proceed like follows: 
1. Make a random draw from estimated parameters for each individual. (Assuming that the 
parameters are distributed normally and have the mean equal to the parameter estimate and the 
standard deviation equal to the standard error of the parameters) 
2. Using the parameter estimates and the characteristics of the individuals to compute the (random) 
transition rate for each individual and for each possible transition. We have performed an auxiliary 
estimation for the transition rates of censoring. 
3. Given the transition rates, draw a random durations for all possible transitions. 
4. The smallest durations for transitions are assumed to be realized. 
5. The remaining random draws are used to obtain the duration for the counterfactual case of no 
transition to temporary employment. 
6. Use the simulated data to compute the statistics (the fraction who had a transition to permanent 
employment) . 
(7. Optional: Check if the model is able to reproduce the real data (e.g. see figure 3).) 
(8. Optional: Contrast the simulated participation with the simulated counterfactual (e.g. see figure 
4).) 
9. Compute the differences: this is the effect of temporary employment on the fraction of people who 
had a transition to permanent employment (e.g. see figure 5). 
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